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GOVERNMENT SECRETS:
THE PUBLIC’S MISCONCEPTIONS OF THE SNOWDEN
DISCLOSURES
Melanie Reid*
“Secrets, silent, stony sit in the dark palaces of both our hearts:
secrets weary of their tyranny: tyrants willing to be
dethroned.”
--James Joyce

I. INTRODUCTION
Human beings are curious by nature. We love to ask
the “why” questions and would rather be privy to a secret
than be kept in the dark. Not surprisingly, government
conspiracy theories are quite popular.1 It is much more
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1 JFK (Warner Bros. 1991) (US Gross Box Office = $70,405,498)
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0102138/business?ref_=tt_dt_bus;
CONSPIRACY THEORY (Warner Bros. 1997) (US Gross Box Office =
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interesting to think part of the government was somehow
involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy
rather than believe the lone gunman theory, or that the
government is covering up an alien invasion by storing UFOs
and alien bodies at Area 51 in Roswell rather than believe no
such thing exists.2
Thus, when Edward Snowden revealed that one of the
government’s most secretive agencies, the National Security
Agency (“NSA”), previously nicknamed “No Such Agency,”
was keeping a huge secret from the American people and
monitoring American citizens’ phone calls, instant messaging,
emails, documents kept in the “cloud,” contact lists,
metadata,3 GPS data, etc., this became one of the greatest
government conspiracy theories to contemplate since JFK and
Roswell.
Is the NSA listening to my phone call right now? What
if I say the word “president” or “al Qaeda,” would they
definitely be listening then? Or what if I “Google” one of
these words? Would the NSA instantly watch what websites I
am viewing?
Of course, it would be extremely difficult to keep such
a large-scale government conspiracy under wraps. It seems
$76,081,498)
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0118883/business?ref_=tt_dt_bus.
2 Journalist Annie Jacobsen surmised that the UFOs and aliens found
in Roswell, Nevada in 1947 were actually Russian children around
12-years-old with large heads and abnormally shaped, over-sized
eyes that were the genetic experiments of Josef Mengele, a former
German Nazi officer and physician in Auschwitz. ANNIE JACOBSEN,
AREA 51: AN UNCENSORED HISTORY OF AMERICA’S TOP SECRET
MILITARY BASE 2011. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin wanted to cause
hysteria in America with the thought of “UFOs and an alien
invasion.” Id.
3 Metadata, or transactional information, is collected as phone calls
“are handed over, as is location data, call duration, unique
identifiers, and the time and duration of all calls. The contents of the
conversation itself are not covered.” Glenn Greenwald, NSA
collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily, THE
GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phonerecords-verizon-court-order. The "business records" provision of the
PATRIOT Act (50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2014)) has been used as a legal
justification for bulk collection of domestic telephone records. Id.
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surprising that any top-secret classified government operation
is kept a secret. Ben Franklin’s famous quote, “[t]hree may
keep a secret, if two of them are dead,”4 might sound
melodramatic but it rings true. Not much is kept secret
anymore – in fact, there appears to be more and more
disclosures as spies, whistleblowers, journalists, and insiders
begin to share their knowledge and spread it throughout the
internet. The public clamors it has a need-to-know in order to
keep the government in check.
But what is it we need to know? Do we need to know
the specifics as to how individual NSA collection programs
work?
Should the public know which communication
methods are being intercepted by the NSA and thus
compromised, or what foreign embassies and consulates are
being surveilled both inside and outside of the U.S., or how
electronic beacons are implanted within targeted electronic
devices, or how the NSA taps into the telecommunications of
service providers, or know about U.S. collection priorities
against foreign countries?
Once the initial reporting on the Snowden leak began
in June 2013, the media and public wanted to know more –
what was the NSA collecting, what were they listening to,
what were they doing with this information, who are they
sharing this information with? The actual legalities and
illegalities of certain NSA programs and collection of data
became more blurred as the media focused on the wide-scale
public outrage at the idea that the government was spying on
its own citizens regardless of the legalities. The media
emphasized the public’s ever-increasing distrust of
government and the intelligence community’s (IC)5 classified
programs.
Benjamin Franklin, Poor Richard’s Almanack (1735), available at
http://www.vlib.us/amdocs/texts/prichard35.html. A student of
mine recently informed me this is also the theme to a show entitled,
“Pretty Little Liars.”
5 “The Intelligence Community (IC) is a group of Executive Branch
agencies and organizations that work separately and together to
engage in intelligence activities that are necessary for the conduct of
foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the
United States.” OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, U.S.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: AN OVERVIEW 7 (2011), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/IC_Consumers_Guide_2011.
4
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Now that the initial deluge of classified information
from Snowden’s leaks has been disclosed, the questions are
two-fold: (1) are these expansive collection programs by the IC
legal or illegal and (2) if legal, are these “whistleblower”
disclosures justified given the resultant damage these leaks
have caused to our national security and law enforcement’s
ability to prevent the commission of future crimes?

II. LEGALITY OF IC’S ACTIONS
What is difficult to determine from the recent media
disclosures is what exactly is being collected, how is the
information collected, at what point can communications be
accessed and analyzed, who receives the analysis, and what is
the legal justification for each step along this process. There is
a significant distinction between authorizations to collect
telephone caller identification record information, or “to” and
“from” information on a particular email address, versus
authorization to listen in on the content of such
communications. If this distinction is not made clear, then the
public can draw erroneous conclusions about alleged breaches
of privacy based upon misinformation.

A. NSA’S BULK COLLECTION OF METADATA: SECTION 215
Snowden disclosed that the NSA is collecting the
metadata from millions and even billions of phone calls and
emails sent out every day, including Americans’ emails and
pdf. Sixteen United States intelligence agencies comprise the IC and
are under the Office of the Director of the National Intelligence: the
Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) National Security Branch, the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) Office of National Security Intelligence,
Department of Treasury Office of Intelligence and Analysis,
Department of Energy Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department
of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and Army,
Air Force, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, and Naval Intelligence. See id.
at 9.
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phone calls.6 Metadata includes “much of the information that
appears on a customer’s telephone bill: the date and time of a
call, its duration, and the participating telephone numbers”
and can include the nature of “how the call was routed from
one participant to the other through the infrastructure of the
telephone companies’ networks.”7
The NSA was given this power when the PATRIOT
Act was passed post-9/11.8 Section 215 of the Act allows the
government to obtain a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC or FISA court) order every ninety days requiring
third parties (including telecommunications providers) to
hand over any records or other “tangible thing” if deemed
“relevant” to “any investigation to obtain foreign intelligence
information not concerning a U.S. person or to protect against
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”9
The NSA utilized this “Access to Certain Business
Records for Foreign Intelligence and International Terrorism
Investigations” power to justify their bulk telephone records
collection program.10 The NSA began to collect metadata from
all sorts of third parties, including telecommunications carriers
and internet providers, in order to have the information close
GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE
NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE 30-32 (2014).
7 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT
ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED
UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE
OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE COURT 8, 21 (Jan. 23, 2014) [hereinafter PCLOB
TELEPHONE RECORDS REPORT], available at
http://www.pclob.gov/library/215Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf.
8 Id.
9 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT
Act) Act of 2001, sec 208(1), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
[hereinafter PATRIOT Act] (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW107publ56/pdf/PLAW-107publ56.pdf., at sec. 215. See also BRENNAN
CENTER FOR JUSTICE, ARE THEY ALLOWED TO DO THAT? A
BREAKDOWN OF SELECTED GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS 1
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Gover
nment%20Surveillance%20Factsheet.pdf.
10 PCLOB TELEPHONE RECORDS REPORT, supra note 7, at 8.
6
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at hand when it came time to conduct a targeted search.11 The
NSA stores these collected telephone records in a centralized
database.12 Before an analyst can access the database and
search for a specific number or selection term, “one of twentytwo designated NSA officials must first determine there is a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the number is associated
with terrorism.”13 Once the analyst gains approval, he or she
“may run queries that will return the calling records for that
seed [number], and permit ‘contact chaining’ to develop a
fuller picture of the seed’s contacts. Contact chaining enables
analysts to retrieve not only the numbers directly in contact
with the seed number (“the first hop”), but also numbers in
contact with all first hop numbers (the “second hop”), as well
as all numbers in contact with all second hop numbers (the
“third hop”).”14
The government’s argument is that one cannot
investigate and prevent terrorist attacks without real-time
access to metadata to determine who is contacting whom and
when. “When the NSA identifies communications that may be
associated with terrorism, it issues intelligence reports to other
federal agencies, such as the FBI, that work to prevent terrorist
attacks.”15 It is difficult to predict when attacks may occur,
even more so if one hand is tied behind the IC’s back when not
given the ability to follow a target’s phone number trail
wherever that might lead.
Critics of section 215 argue that by permitting
intelligence agencies, specifically the NSA, to collect metadata
from a variety of third parties, section 215 allows the
government to get a whole picture of a person by searching
one’s “financial, library, travel, video rental, phone, medical,
church, synagogue, and mosque records . . . providing the
government says it’s trying to protect against terrorism.”16
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 1-2.
PCLOB TELEPHONE RECORDS REPORT, supra note 7, at 8.
13 Id. at 8-9.
14 Id. at 9.
15 Id. at 8.
16 Emma Roller, This Is What Section 215 of the Patriot Act Does, SLATE
(June 7, 2013, 1:17 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2013/06/07/nsa_prism_scan
dal_what_patriot_act_section_215_does.html.
11
12
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Metadata, “if properly exploited, could yield more valuable
information than recordings of the phone calls or email
messages themselves.”17
Critics further argue that “[i]t is difficult to believe that
the phone records of millions of Americans are actually
‘relevant’ to a specific terrorist or foreign intelligence
investigation. Nor does Section 215 appear to allow the
government to collect first and determine relevance later,
which is what the government claims it is doing.”18
In January 2014, the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board (PCLOB)19 issued a report after reviewing the
NSA’s bulk collection of phone records. The PCLOB found
the bulk collection of phone records failed to comply with
Section 215 and therefore should be terminated or significantly
revised.20 The PCLOB determined (1) the bulk telephone
records acquired had “no connection to any specific FBI
investigation at the time of their collection;” (2) since the
records are collected in bulk, they are not “relevant” to a
particular investigation as required under section 215; (3)
requiring telephone companies to furnish new call records on
a daily basis is not permitted under section 215 nor FISA; and
(4) section 215 only permits the FBI and not the NSA to obtain
records relevant to a terrorism or foreign intelligence
investigation.21
That same month, President Obama made his own
comments regarding the section 215 program, stating he
would continue to allow government use of bulk phone
records while they attempt to come up with an alternative
SHANE HARRIS, THE WATCHERS: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S
SURVEILLANCE STATE 204-05 (Penguin Books, 2011).
18 BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 3.
19 The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) was
established in 2004 by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004. In 2007, the 9/11 Commission Act
restructured the Board requiring that all five members be appointed
by the President. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e)(e) (2012 & Supp. 2014).
As a result, the Board did not fully exist until June 2013, after the
Senate confirmed members to resume operations. PRIVACY AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, http://www.pclob.gov/about-us
(last visited Aug. 23, 2014).
20 PCLOB TELEPHONE RECORDS REPORT, supra note 7, at 10.
21 Id.
17
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solution “without the government holding this metadata
itself” and would require the agency to get court approval
prior to accessing the metadata.22 The NSA would also no
longer be able to access records that go beyond two persons
removed from the original query.23
In response to these findings, in May 2014, the House
passed the USA Freedom Act24 which focuses on the NSA’s
call-records program in which the agency retains billions of
records for all phone calls made from or to the United States.
Under the legislation, telecommunications companies would
retain those records, and the NSA would only have access to
specific information about targeted individuals under court
orders.25 A year later, due to inaction by the Senate, the bulk
collection program under section 215 was allowed to expire on
June 1, 2015.26 The Senate then approved the USA Freedom
Transcript of President Obama’s Jan. 17 Speech on NSA Reforms,
WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-presidentobamas-jan-17-speech-on-nsa-reforms/2014/01/17/fa33590a-7f8c11e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html.
23 Id.
24 USA Freedom Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (2013-2014), available at
https://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3361.
25 Id. The bill “[r]equires the FBI to include in such tangible thing
applications a specific selection term to be used as the basis for such
production.” Id. A “specific selection term” is “a term specifically
identifying a person, entity, account, address, or device” that is
“used by the government to limit the scope of the information or
tangible things sought pursuant to the statute.” Id. In each
application requesting call detail records (i.e., telephone numbers
and time or duration of a call), the FBI must show “(1) reasonable
grounds to believe that the call detail records sought to be produced
based on the specific selection term are relevant to such
investigation; and (2) facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that such specific selection term is associated with a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.” Id.
26 Opinion and Order In re Application of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things,
Docket No. BR 15-75, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, June
29, 2015 at 2. See also Erin Kelly, Here’s what happens now that the
Patriot Act Provisions Expired, USA Today, June 1, 2015,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/05/31/patrio
t-act-expires-senate-stalemate/28260905/.
22
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Act on June 2nd, and the revised Section 215 program which
effectively eliminates bulk collection will continue until
December 15, 2019.27 The USA Freedom Act allows the bulk
collection of telephone metadata for only a 180 day transition
period (until November 29, 2015) during which such collection
could continue.28

B. NSA’S MONITORING OF CONVERSATIONS: FISA AND
SECTION 702
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act addresses the bulk
collection of telephone records, and the FISA Amendments of
2008 (FAA) address the collection and subsequent analysis of
the content of telephone and internet communications.29 The
FAA (also known as section 702) has been utilized to allow the
NSA to work with electronic communication service providers
“to copy, scan, and filter internet and phone traffic coming
through their physical infrastructure” and compel the
disclosure of the content of such communications so long as it
targets foreign persons reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States.30 No particular warrant is required
in that instance. The targeting of the non-U.S. person on
foreign soil must be conducted in order to acquire foreign
Opinion and Order In re Application of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things,
Docket No. BR 15-75, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, June
29, 2015 at 2-3 (citing to USA FREEDOM Act § 705(a)).
28 Opinion and Order In re Application of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things,
Docket No. BR 15-75, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, June
29, 2015 at 10-11 (citing to section 109(a) of the USA FREEDOM Act).
29 H.R. 6304, 110th Cong. (2007-2008), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr6304enr/pdf/BILLS110hr6304enr.pdf.
30 ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, COMMENTS OF THE ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION REGARDING SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE AMENDMENTS ACT TO THE PRIVACY AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD 8 (Apr. 22, 2014), available at
https://www.eff.org/files/2014/04/22/eff_pclob_comments_11_ap
ril_2014.pdf; See also H.R. 6304, 110th Cong. (2007-2008), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr6304enr/pdf/BILLS110hr6304enr.pdf.
27
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intelligence information as defined in FISA, and the NSA must
obtain approval from the FISA court as to their targeting and
minimization procedures prior to collection to make sure U.S.
persons are not inadvertently intercepted.31
Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to separate the
collection of phone and internet communications of strictly
foreign persons from U.S. persons if the foreign person is
communicating with a U.S. person.32 These communications
are also potentially being copied and stored in a searchable
database.33 Information on U.S. persons may incidentally be
collected if that U.S. person communicates with a non-U.S.
person that is being targeted or two non-U.S. persons discuss
the U.S. person.34 Or, a U.S. person’s conversation may
inadvertently be collected by mistake if erroneously targeted
by the NSA and thought to be a non-U.S. person.35 In the case
of inadvertent collection, the communications must be
destroyed.36
The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board
(PCLOB) approved of the Section 702 program in its report
dated July 2, 2014, stating:
PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 6 (July 2, 2014) [hereinafter
PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT], available at
https://www.nsa.gov/civil_liberties/_files/pclob_section_702_repo
rt.pdf. “The targeting procedures govern how the executive branch
determines that a particular person is reasonably believed to be a
non-U.S. person located outside the United States, and that targeting
this person will lead to the acquisition of foreign intelligence
information. The minimization procedures cover the acquisition,
retention, use, and dissemination of any non-publicly available U.S.
person information acquired through the Section 702 program.” Id.
at 6-7. “For example, the NSA’s minimization procedures require
that queries of Section 702-acquired information be designed so that
they are ‘reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence
information.’” Id. at 8.
32 JAMES BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY: THE ULTRA-SECRET NSA
FROM 9/11 TO THE EAVESDROPPING ON AMERICA 304 (Anchor Books,
2009).
33 Id.
34 PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT, supra note 28, at 6.
35 Id.
36 Id.
31
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[t]he Section 702 program has enabled the
government to acquire a greater range of
foreign intelligence than it otherwise would
have been able to obtain – and to do so quickly
and effectively.
Compared with the
“traditional” FISA process under Title I of the
statute, Section 702 imposes significantly fewer
limits on the government . . . [t]he program has
proven valuable in the government’s efforts to
combat terrorism as well as in other areas of
foreign intelligence. . . . [m]onitoring terrorist
networks under Section 702 has enabled the
government to learn how they operate, and to
understand their priorities, strategies, and
tactics.37
While the core of the section 702 program was deemed
to be “reasonable” under Fourth Amendment law, the PCLOB
set forth additional proposals to address their concerns about
the unknown and potentially large scope of the
incidental
collection
of
U.S.
persons’
communications, the use of “about” collection
to acquire Internet communications that are
neither to nor from the target of surveillance,
and the use of queries to search for the
communications of specific U.S. persons within
the information that has been collected.38
On June 19, 2014, the House passed a bill that includes
an amendment which bars the NSA, the CIA, and others in the
IC from actually examining the communications of Americans
that were collected into databases created to target
foreigners.39 Critics have called this technique the “backdoor

Id. at 9-10.
PCLOB TELEPHONE RECORDS REPORT, supra note 7, at 9.
39 H.R. 5016, 113th Cong. (2013-2014), available at
https://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/housebill/5016/amendments.
37
38
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search loophole.”40 “The bill also prohibits the government
from requiring a private company to alter its software to allow
clandestine surveillance.”41

C. LEGAL CONCLUSIONS AS TO IC ACTIONS
In summary, upon review of FISA, the FAA, and the
PATRIOT Act, it would be lawful for the NSA to monitor
electronic communications of foreign persons reasonably
believed42 to be located overseas without any type of warrant.
However, if that person is a “U.S. person” or that foreign
person was to communicate with a person located in the
United States, the NSA would need to apply for a FISA
warrant. The difficulty is in determining where the particular
person is located at the time of the call. While the law does
not allow the intentional monitoring of U.S. persons, the FISC
approves minimization procedures to limit the amount of
information about U.S. persons that is intercepted, retained,
and disseminated. Hence, the IC’s monitoring of content in
communications is legal.
On the other hand, the legality of the NSA’s collection
of metadata is uncertain. While the NSA had previously used
section 215 of the PATRIOT Act to justify its bulk records

Charlie Savage, House Votes to Curb N.S.A. Scrutiny of Americans’
Communications, NY TIMES (June 20, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/21/us/politics/house-votes-tocurb-nsa-scrutiny-of-americans-communications.html.
41 Andrew Rosenthal, The House Actually Did Something About
Warrantless Surveillance, TAKING NOTE: THE EDITORIAL PAGE EDITOR’S
BLOG (June 20, 2014, 1:30 PM),
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/20/the-houseactually-did-something-about-warrantless-surveillance/.
42 “[T]he NSA has reportedly interpreted that to mean that it need
only ensure ’51 percent confidence of the target’s ‘foreignness.’”
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 3; See also Barton
Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British intelligence mining data from
nine U.S. Internet companies in broad secret program, WASH. POST (June
6, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/usintelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broadsecret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845d970ccb04497_story.html.
40
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collection program,43 it is now clear that the NSA has been
collecting more than foreign persons’ metadata and metadata
not necessarily relevant to a terrorism or foreign intelligence
investigation.44
Regardless, the bulk data collection of
business records and other tangible things, as we know it, will
terminate after November 29, 2015.45 After such date, the IC
will have to furnish “specific selection term[s]” to the FISC
before being granted access to such metadata from third party
communications providers.46 However, at the time of the
Snowden leak, both the monitoring of content and the bulk
records collection program were legally justified.

III. SNOWDEN’S REASONS FOR DISCLOSURE VERSUS DAMAGE
DONE TO NATIONAL SECURITY
A. BULK COLLECTION AND KEEPING THE INTERNET
“FREE”
Snowden’s real complaint seems to boil down to the
NSA’s collection of metadata – not the subsequent analysis of
this data because targeting and minimization procedures have
been put in place to avoid bulk analysis of the data collected.
Therefore, Snowden is concerned about the potential for abuse
in the collection of metadata not necessarily current abuse of
power now that this data is in the hands of the NSA.

50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(a)(1) (2003 & Supp. 2014).
Barton Gellman et al., In NSA-intercepted Data, Those Not Targeted
Far Outnumber the Foreigners Who Are, WASH. POST (July 5, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsaintercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreignerswho-are/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-85724b1b969b6322_story.html?hpid=z1.
45 Opinion and Order In re Application of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things,
Docket No. BR 15-75, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, June
29, 2015 at 18.
46 Opinion and Order In re Application of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things,
Docket No. BR 15-75, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, June
29, 2015 at 10 (citing to USA FREEDOM Act § 103(b), amending FISA
§ 501(c)).
43
44
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Snowden has given several interviews and written
manifestos explaining why the public needs to know the
specifics as to what the NSA is collecting and how they are
collecting it. In Snowden’s eyes, only with the public’s input
can true regulation and accountability take place.47
Apparently, congressional oversight committees, the FISC, the
Department of Justice, internal agency auditing and
monitoring, and oversight from the Executive branch is not
enough. It bears reminding that the previously described
collection and surveillance programs are regulated – by
Congress, by the FISC, by the Department of Justice and by
oversight lawyers within intelligence agencies themselves.48
Snowden wants to keep the internet free from NSA
collection – so that those who grow up on the internet feel free
to explore, make mistakes, and express themselves without
fear that anyone is watching.49 Unfortunately, regardless of
whether the NSA is watching, others are and will always be
watching. Private companies make it their mission to collect as
much information as possible on individual consumers and
sell it to the highest commercial bidder. Criminals both
overseas and in our own back yard who want to steal our
information are monitoring and exploiting the Internet as well.
Director of the FBI, James Comey, recently stated,
GREENWALD, supra note 6, at 13, 30-31.
At a recent debate, former CIA director James Woolsey stated,
I have seen, either from in the Executive
Branch, or as a private citizen interested in
these issues and following them, the
oversight personnel capabilities, numbers of
offices, numbers of people involved in
overseeing the American system of
intelligence is truly awesome. There is no
country anywhere in the world that has the
massive oversight from legislative, judicial,
and executive sides and functions over their
intelligence systems. Nobody is even close
to the United States.
Transcript of INTELLIGENCE SQUARED U.S. debate, Snowden was
justified, (Feb. 12, 2014), available at
http://intelligencesquaredus.org/images/debates/past/transcripts
/021214%20Snowden.pdf.
49 GREENWALD, supra note 6, at 46-47.
47
48
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I think there's something about sitting in front
of your own computer working on your own
banking, your own health care, your own social
life that makes it hard to understand the danger
(of third party surveillance, cybercrime, and
cyber-attacks on companies and individuals on
the internet). I mean, the Internet is the most
dangerous parking lot imaginable. But if you
were crossing a mall parking lot late at night,
your entire sense of danger would be
heightened. You would stand straight. You'd
walk quickly. You'd know where you were
going. You would look for light. Folks are
wandering around that proverbial parking lot
of the Internet all day long, without giving it a
thought to whose attachments they're opening,
what sites they're visiting. And that makes it
easy for the bad guys.50
The Internet, unfortunately, will never be free from
surveillance. Even if our government is not monitoring the
Internet, there will always be a myriad of bad actors that do.
Foreign Intelligence Services target the Internet to collect
positive intelligence and steal trade secrets, cyber criminals
hack into our private e-mails and steal personal identification
information, terrorist organizations promote jihad and the
destruction of our cyber infrastructure.
More importantly, do we want our government to be
proactive and attempt to prevent or disrupt terrorist attacks
before they take place? If the answer is yes, then we need to
provide federal law enforcement with a requisite amount of
surveillance tools to be able to accomplish this mission.

Transcript of Interview by Scott Pelley with James Comey, Oct. 5,
2014, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-directorjames-comey-on-threat-of-isis-cybercrime/.
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B. BULK COLLECTION AND THE POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE OF
POWER
Snowden’s argument for public disclosure would be
much stronger if he could point to specific abuses of power
that would liken current NSA activities to those abuses
disclosed in the 1970’s during the Church Committee hearings.
The Church Committee discovered that the IC had illegally
gathered information and compiled files on communists in the
1950s and civil rights groups and Vietnam War protesters in
the 1960s.51 These findings resulted in a significant overhaul in
IC oversight and accountability and the passage of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 in order to prevent
future abuse of power by the IC.52
In addition to his concerns about NSA spying on
Americans through its bulk collection programs, Snowden
also disclosed examples of individual government employees
who abused the power and responsibility placed in their
hands. This abuse of power was illegal, and the offenders
should have faced criminal or severe administrative penalties,
but their behavior in many instances was either condoned or
overlooked. In one article, Snowden is quoted as saying,
Many of the people searching through the
haystacks were young, enlisted guys, 18 to 22
years old. They’ve suddenly been thrust into a
position of extraordinary responsibility, where
they now have access to all your private
records. In the course of their daily work, they
stumble across something that is completely
unrelated in any sort of necessary sense – for
example, an intimate nude photo of someone in
a sexually compromising situation. But they’re
extremely attractive. So what do they do? They
turn around in their chair and they show a coUNITED STATES SENATE, Senate History: January 27, 1975 Church
Committee Created,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Church_Co
mmittee_Created.htm.
52 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511,
92 Stat. 1793 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 to 1811 (2014)).
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worker. And their co-worker says, “Oh, hey,
that’s great. Send that to Bill down the way,”
and then Bill sends it to George, George sends it
to Tom, and sooner or later this person’s whole
life has been seen by all of these other people.
The analysts don’t discuss such things in the
NSA cafeterias, but back in the office anything
goes, more or less. You’re in a vaulted space.
Everybody has sort of similar clearances,
everybody knows everybody. It’s a small
world. It’s never reported, because the auditing
of these systems is incredibly weak. The fact
that records of your intimate moments have
been taken from your private communication
stream, from the intended recipient, and given
to the government, without any specific
authorisation, without any specific need, is
itself a violation of your rights. [When asked
how often do such things happen?] . . . I’d say
probably every two months. It’s routine
enough. These are seen as sort of the fringe
benefits of surveillance positions.53
Everyone would agree that NSA analysts should not be
opening private email attachments that contain naked photos
(or any non-foreign intelligence related material for that
matter) and sending them to their colleagues. This is illegal
and there should be repercussions. But was exposure of
childish behavior by a few analysts of such significance to
outweigh the damage done to our nation’s security due to
Snowden’s disclosures?
Other reasons why Snowden made such disclosures
include: (1) disgust over CIA operatives who would get
targets drunk enough to land in jail and then bail them out in
order to recruit an asset,54 (2) Clapper lying in a congressional
Alan Rusbridger & Ewan Macaskill, I, Spy: Edward Snowden in
Exile, THE GUARDIAN, July 19, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/18/-sp-edwardsnowden-interview-rusbridger-macaskill.
54 James Bamford, The Most Wanted Man in the World, WIRED, Aug. 13,
2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/08/edward-snowden/.
53
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hearing about whether the NSA collects data on Americans,55
(3) military and CIA drones and targeted killings,56 (4) outrage
over the NSA’s “ability to map the movement of everyone in a
city by monitoring their MAC address, a unique identifier
emitted by every cell phone, computer, and other electronic
device,”57 (5) NSA’s access to email and other Internet traffic
from Syria during the civil war,58 (6) the NSA’s building of a
Massive Data Repository where “billions of phone calls, faxes,
emails, computer-to-computer data transfers, and text
messages from around the world [would] flow through the
MDR every hour,”59 and (7) the NSA’s access to virtually all
private communications coming in from overseas to people in
the US in order to “identify these malicious traffic flows and
respond to them.”60
Again, the resounding concern is collection, and the
fact that the public is not told about the mass collection. As
mentioned, some of Snowden’s complaints had nothing to do
with bulk collection. Snowden did have a list of individual
government employees whose actions merited administrative
action and reprimand, but their specific activity did not
undermine the legality or wisdom of the programs which
Snowden was actually railing against. Snowden has certainly
been successful at opening the dialogue as to bulk collection –
as everyone is now discussing collection, how to reform or
eliminate section 215, and how to move collection from
government’s hands to a third party.61
At a congressional hearing on March 12, 2014, Senator Ron Wyden
asked Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, “Does the
NSA collect any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of
millions of Americans?” Clapper responded, “No sir . . . not
wittingly.” Fred Kaplan, Fire James Clapper, SLATE, June 11, 2013,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/20
13/06/fire_dni_james_clapper_he_lied_to_congress_about_nsa_surv
eillance.html.
56 Bamford, supra note 54.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Would a third party’s (telecommunications company) employees
perform better than government employees and abuse their power
much less than government employees that undergo background
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Transparency is important to a certain degree. It keeps
the government honest and it ensures the public can keep tabs
on the checks and balances that are put in place to ensure
abuse does not occur. But too much transparency defeats the
very purpose of clandestine intelligence operations in the first
place, i.e., to protect the American public and keep the bad
guys in the dark as to our intentions and capabilities. The
general public has already been informed as to the purpose
and mission of the NSA, plus a vague description of NSA
collection platforms and capabilities is readily available. Once
you delve into the details such as specific methods and
sources, and the identities of certain targets, then this
information becomes sensitive and classified, and as such,
should be available to only those who are trusted and have a
legitimate need to know. It may be advisable to have an open
discussion on collection but there is no need to go into details
that are classified, since such disclosures could cause harm to
national security. Whistleblowers certainly need to step
forward to discuss abuse within the system, especially when
these failures are not being addressed by oversight committees
within or outside the IC agencies. Certainly, on an individual
level, when government analysts are caught monitoring calls
and opening attachments that are not relevant to an
authorized investigation, these people need to be brought to
the attention of that agency’s internal security team. However,
there are multiple administrative layers of authority, policy
review officials and security personnel available to anyone
concerned who earnestly wants to report wrong doing or
illegal activity.
One concern raised by Snowden is the allegation that
the NSA “has been gathering records of online sexual activity
and evidence of visits to pornographic websites as part of a
proposed plan to harm the reputations of those whom the
agency believes are radicalizing others [to become devoted to
the jihadist cause] through incendiary speeches.”62 The six

checks and significant vetting before being granted top secret
clearances?
62 Glenn Greenwald, Ryan Grim, & Ryan Gallagher, Top Secret
Document Reveals NSA Spied on Porn Habits as Part of Plan to Discredit
‘Radicalizers’, HUFF. POST, Nov. 26, 2013,
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“radicalizers” known to be targeted by the NSA were Muslim
and all are believed to be currently residing outside the United
States though one has been described as a U.S. person.63
Snowden argued in a recent interview that this type of
surveillance and individual targeting may easily find its way
into U.S. politics, and these tactics could be used to spy on the
pornography-viewing habits of political opponents. 64
However, there is no evidence to suggest such a giant leap has
been made, and this type of slippery slope is exactly what
oversight committees, supervisors, and government lawyers,
need to monitor, and prevent any subsequent abuse of
power.65
The United States Intelligence Community including
the NSA collects foreign political, economic and military
intelligence in order to provide U.S. policy makers with the
necessary information to make the proper decisions in order to
protect our national security and promote America’s best
interests both at home and abroad. To accomplish this goal,
the IC, within certain legal limits needs to have access to every
conceivable intelligence collection technique. The moral and
ethical use of these tools, the potential benefits and possibility
for abuse, the advisability and public acceptance for these
techniques, are questions and discussions best left to the three
branches of our government, and the public, to a more limited
extent, to iron out.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/nsa-pornmuslims_n_4346128.html.
63 Id.
64 Bamford, supra note 54.
65 For example, it was reported that CIA officers searched the
computers of congressional staff while they prepared a Senate
Intelligence Committee report on the CIA’s detention and
interrogation program. The CIA’s inspector general investigated the
matter and sent a criminal referral to the DOJ for further
investigation. Mark Mazetti & Carl Hulse, Inquiry by C.I.A. Affirms It
Spied on Senate Panel, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/01/world/senate-intelligencecommitee-cia-interrogation-report.html?_r=0. This is exactly what
needs to be done when abuse of power is suspected.
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IV. THE DAMAGE DONE
Chairman of the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies and former Director of the CIA, James Woolsey,
during a recent debate on whether Snowden was justified,
described four programs which have been compromised due
to the disclosures: (1) pre-Snowden, the IC had learned how to
counter Chinese cyber-attacks by sending their malware back
to the hackers after making some adjustments and creating
problems for them; Snowden’s disclosures explained how the
U.S. was able to do this; (2) pre-Snowden, the IC was able to
read emails and early stage drafts of emails of the Islamic State
of Iraq; Snowden’s disclosures allowed the terrorist group to
learn of this; (3) pre-Snowden, the Defense Department had
technology that allowed soldiers and CIA operatives to know
whether they were being followed; post-Snowden, this
technology has been shared with our adversaries; and (4) preSnowden, the U.S. learned how to penetrate the
communication networks in some Latin American countries of
some of the worst organizations and groups that are selling
women, principally women into sexual slavery; post-Snowden
those sex trafficking organizations now know which
communication networks are compromised.66
Any time a government employee or unauthorized
person reveals sources and methods used by law enforcement
or the IC, this disclosure allows criminals, spies, and terrorists
alike to minimize their risk of getting caught by taking
countermeasures. When FBI Director Comey reveals that “the
emergence of default encryption settings and encrypted
devices and networks” will “leave law enforcement in the
dark” and then names the specific companies building these
devices, the concern is that criminals will use these loopholes
to avoid detection.67 The protection of sources and methods is
critical to curtail illegal activity.
Transcript of INTELLIGENCE SQUARED U.S. debate, supra note 43.
Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision
Course? A Conversation with FBI Director James Comey, BROOKINGS
INST., Oct. 16, 2014, transcript available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2014/10/16%20goin
g%20dark%20technology%20privacy%20comey%20fbi/20141016_fbi
_comey_transcript.pdf.
66
67
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Perhaps the exposure of specific programs, sources,
and methods is not the only problem, since there is now the
dilemma or revelation of what was not disclosed, what does
not exist, which indirectly underscores NSA limitations. In
other words, if all of NSA’s programs are disclosed,
theoretically everything that was not revealed does not exist.
NSA surveillance capabilities would be limited to the
techniques exposed by Snowden and others. Criminals and
terrorists alike have typically displayed signs of paranoia
believing that IC capabilities approach the levels of those
depicted in science fiction, and some adversaries are
concerned that their every move is being watched by law
enforcement.
And more than likely, our sophisticated
adversaries assume the government has greater surveillance
powers than they actually do. The mystique of “big brother”
can be a more effective weapon and deterrent than if our
adversaries actually knew our true capabilities. What these
disclosures have revealed is that the government has limits to
what they can target, who they can target, and what they can
access. As Snowden argues in his own words, “[t]he fact that
people know communications can be monitored does not stop
people from communicating [digitally]. Because the only
choices are to accept the risk, or to not communicate at all.”68
But at least now, our adversaries know which communication
service providers cooperate with the government, the specific
collection techniques being used, and where the IC has
focused the majority of its efforts. Our adversaries can now
develop
countermeasures,
alternative
methods
of
communicating with one another, and avoid or eliminate
operations with identified vulnerabilities. NSA’s mystique of
know-all, see-all has been seriously tarnished.
Extensive damage has been done to U.S. credibility and
trust issues with its foreign allies who no longer blindly trust
the United States with their intelligence secrets. Our allies
have reassessed the level of their cooperation on intelligence
Bamford, supra note 54. “And when we’re talking about things like
terrorist cells, nuclear proliferators – these are organised cells. These
are things an individual cannot do on their own. So if they abstain
from communicating, we’ve already won. If we’ve basically talked
the terrorists out of using our modern communications networks, we
have benefited in terms of security – we haven’t lost.” Id.
68
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sharing since the United States has been shown incapable of
keeping secrets and even occasionally spies on its closest
foreign partners. Foreign allies may be hesitant to cooperate
on the next terrorism investigation. Communications service
providers that were willing to cooperate with the government
previously on issues dealing with national security and efforts
to combat terrorism are now exposed, and may refuse to
cooperate with the government in the future without being
forced to do so by a court order.

V. CONCLUSION
It is not surprising Snowden revealed top secret
information on NSA surveillance programs twelve years after
9/11. When the PATRIOT Act, which provided the IC and law
enforcement with expansive surveillance and investigative
powers, passed in 2001, the law had strong popular support.
Americans feared for their safety. The government took
significant legal steps to ensure they would be better able to
attempt to predict and prevent another terrorist attack before
it occurred, and they have been, for the most part, extremely
successful in thwarting other 9/11-type attacks. Therefore, it is
ironic that the IC’s own success has paved the way for
whistleblowers such as Snowden to gain sufficient popularity
in order to reveal NSA programs under the guise of being
concerned about our right to privacy. The pendulum has
swung the other way, and Americans are more concerned
about potentially being monitored by the government than
they were immediately after 9/11. If the government had been
unsuccessful in preventing attacks, the concern would be
entirely different. The question would be what more can the
IC do to prevent such attacks from occurring rather than the
current question as to why the government is collecting so
much personal data. The risk of terrorist attacks seems to be, at
the very least, stabilized, and the bigger concern is our civil
liberties. Due to its success, the IC is now on the defensive (for
the opposite reason, i.e., intelligence failures identified post
9/11, the IC was encouraged to go on the offense). The
pendulum swings in both directions.
In short, all the media hype and “24/7 surveillance
state” diatribes should be taken with a grain of salt. The
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moniker “big, bad government” is a misnomer although our
system remains imperfect. Our leadership and government
employees are for the most part decent, honest, reliable folks
who are doing their jobs to the best of their ability. Some
government employees are abusing their power and should be
punished.
When discussing government surveillance
practices, there must be adequate oversight to avoid
widespread, abusive practices that gradually become so
pervasive that they are deemed acceptable: the habitual,
standard routine that becomes self-justifying and immune to
conscience and ethical scrutiny. However, full and specific
disclosure when it comes to the sensitive nature of intelligence
collection and its analysis is unnecessary. There are legal
remedies, anonymous tip lines, and multiple avenues to report
wrong doing when a whistleblower becomes concerned about
“perceived” illegal activity by the government. Snowden did
not pursue most of these legal remedies before disclosing
classified information to the media. It is true that certain
aspects of NSA’s bulk collection and interception efforts may
require further review and legal clarifications, but such
discussions need not take place on the front page of
newspapers.
The recent disclosures of NSA abuse as
“perceived” by Snowden do not come close to the pervasive
abuses described by the Church Committee in the seventies.
Despite Snowden’s pleas for an open-source
community free from monitoring, the Internet is not and will
not be free from surveillance regardless if the NSA participates
or not. It is naive to think otherwise. The government needs to
collect and analyze intelligence information in order to arrive
at the best domestic, foreign, economic, military, law
enforcement, or political decisions possible, and that includes
policy decisions on the fight against terrorism.
In one interview, Snowden makes reference to the
German Stasi that conducted “mass, indiscriminate spying
campaigns”69 in communist-dominated East Germany where
the secret police collected information on roughly one quarter
of the population.70 The NSA is not the Stasi of East Germany

Rusbridger & Macaskill, supra note 48.
Julia Angwin, You Know Who Else Collected Metadata? The Stasi.,
PROPUBLICA, Feb. 11, 2014,
69
70
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– the NSA is not conducting mass, indiscriminate spying
campaigns hoping to catch anti-government protestors in
incriminating positions in order to lock them away and
eliminate any and all dissent. Stasi-like dossiers are not being
created on individuals who vote a certain way or oppose
government policies. NSA does not monitor U.S. citizens to
identify their daily activities, what errands they run, what
websites they are viewing, and how their children are doing in
school. What NSA does do is collect positive intelligence
information, foreign intelligence information which is
collected and analysed under legal parameters.
These
collection efforts are meant to protect U.S. citizens from future
terrorist attacks and future cyber-attacks. Under section 702,
targeting and minimization procedures are in place, and FISA
warrants are required when the NSA wants to target U.S.
citizens suspected of being agents of a foreign power.
It is not the government surveillance programs we
should be overly concerned about. Public discussion and
congressional and internal oversight committees keep those
necessary but controversial programs under control and
within legal parameters. It is the few isolated cases of
individuals within the government who abuse their power
and betray the American people who are of major concern,
e.g., those who abuse their power and violate sections 215, 702
and FISA laws. Those are the illegalities that should be
brought to light, not our government’s specific sources,
methods, capabilities, and successes that our enemies
desperately want revealed.

http://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-stasi-spied-on-socialnetworks.

